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How are Oil Revenues Redistributed in an Oil Economy? 




In 2010, Kazakhstan will have joined the club of the ten largest oil exporters in the 
world. The IMF is forecasting oil revenues of $99 billion over the next 45 years for 
this country of fifteen million people; compared to the current level, GDP per capita 
could be multiplied by four.  The coming decades will see a huge stimulus to 
Kazakhstan’s economy and potential for economic development. Within this 
encouraging framework, Kazakh authorities strive “to generate a pattern of growth in 
the coming decades that is conducive to job creation and raise living standards across 
the vast majority of the population” (World Bank, 2005). With this end in view, 
redistributing oil revenues appears to be the crux of future economic and social 
development in Kazakhstan. 
The cross-country evidence, however, suggests that there may be pitfalls.   
Sachs and Warner (1995) found a negative relationship between resource abundance 
and economic growth in cross-country regressions.  Subsequent contributions have 
refined the debate of oil as a curse, establishing that the relationship is conditional (on 
variables proxying for institutions or on democracy) and that the negative relationship 
is stronger for oil and minerals than for agriculture.
1  Papyrakis and Gerlagh (2004) 
obtain a negative coefficient on their natural resource variable (share of minerals in 
GDP) in a simple conditional convergence growth regression, but the coefficient 
becomes positive when measures of corruption, openness and schooling are added to 
the right-hand side.  This fits with the observation that successful resource-rich 
countries like Norway or Australia or Malaysia have open economies and low levels 
of corruption, but does not address the issue of whether resource-abundance has 
fuelled corruption in countries like Nigeria or Venezuela. 
The Sachs-Warner results are interesting, but beg the next questions.  What 
transmission mechanisms make a resource boom a curse? How are oil revenues 
redistributed in an oil economy? How should redistribution mechanisms be designed 
to benefit across a vast majority of the population?  As oil exports grow, discontent in 
oil-producing regions and in the poorest regions of the oil country simultaneously 
grow, as oil-producing regions wish to keep a higher share of oil revenues whereas 
poorest regions request a higher redistribution share. Nigeria has experienced this 
conjunction of discontents for decades (Ikein et al., 1998).  In Russia, approximately 
three-quarters of oil revenues flow to Moscow creating a struggle between the 
politicians in regions of oil extraction and the central authorities (Dienes, 2002, 451).  
The main value added of this paper is the empirical approach we use to assess 
the impact of the oil boom. The selected case study is Kazakhstan
2 because an oil 
                                                 
1 See, for example, the literature review and regression analysis in the first two sections of Sala-i-Martin 
and Subramanian (2003), and Stevens (2003). Isham et al. (2003) distinguish between point-source 
resources (oil, natural fertilizers and cotton) and coffee/cocoa, which have been associated with poor 
growth performance, and other natural resources, which have not.  This is the usual result, although 
Korhonen (2004) finds that the largest negative effects on growth come from non-fuel extractive raw 
materials. 
2 Kazakhstan is the second largest country of the Former Soviet Union, covering an area of 2.7 million 
square kilometres. The population has shrunk since 1991 and is now less than 15 million.     2
boom has driven Kazakhstan’s economy since the discovery of large new oilfields in 
the late 1990’s and early 2000’s. We use household survey data from before and after 
the start of the oil boom to assess the extent to which the benefits from the oil boom 
were retained in the oil-producing regions, or spread evenly across the national 
economy, or were concentrated in metropolitan centres. 
Our assessment of the impact of oil boom confirms that oil revenues are not 
widely spread in the country, especially in rural regions (where oil is extracted).  One 
of the two largest oil-producing regions remains, on average, the poorest region of the 
country. On the contrary, the two capitals of the country (Almaty, the former capital 
and financial centre, and Astana, the capital since 1997), home to the country’s elite, 
have seen a major improvement of living conditions and revenues. Neither 
redistribution which oil companies undertake through social projects nor official 
redistribution through regional budgets seems to reach the poorest population in oil-
producing regions, and it remains a major challenge for any government to 
redistribute evenly oil revenues in an oil economy.  So far the main channel for 
redistribution has been unofficial, through the informal economy. 
  The next section gives figures presenting the oil boom in Kazakhstan as well 
as production prospects. The third section presents the importance of oil sector in 
Kazakhstan’s economy. The fourth section identifies three redistribution mechanisms, 
and the fifth section gives a preliminary assessment of the mechanisms in Kazakhstan. 
The sixth section presents poverty and living standards figures before and after the 
first oil boom. The seventh section introduces a first-cut analysis of the household 
survey data and assess the importance of the of each redistribution mechanisms. The 
eighth section concludes.   
 
2. Oil Boom in Kazakhstan  
 
  Despite the fact that the start of oil extraction in Kazakhstan dates back to the 
early twentieth century, oil production only started to grow significantly in the 1970s 
and 1980s (see Graph 1).  During the Soviet times, Kazakhstan was a Republic whose 
two main economic pillars were agriculture and livestock farming (over two-fifths of 
GDP in 1990) and coalmining and metal smelting (Pomfret, 1995, 80-5)  
When independence occurred in 1991, the oil sector in Kazakhstan confronted 
several handicaps.   
First of all, prospecting for new reserves under the potentially oil-rich North 
Caspian was delayed for several years by disagreements over delimitation of national 
territories and by domestic wrangles over selling exploration rights to foreign firms 
possessing the technology to explore the offshore fields.   
Secondly and even more importantly, the pre-existing pipelines were 
controlled by a Russian enterprise, Transneft, which overtly discriminated against 
Kazakh oil.  After the dissolution of the USSR, the government of Kazakhstan took 
over the state’s share in the TengizChevroil
3 joint venture, but Russia claimed rights 
to part of the oil and also controlled the only existing pipeline about whose access no 
commitment had been made in the original agreement.  The Russian state-owned 
                                                                                                                                            
Administratively, the country is divided into fourteen oblasts (or regions) and two cities (Astana and 
Almaty).  
3 Current Tengizchevroil ownership structure is the following: Chevron (operator) 50%, ExxonMobil 
(25%), Republic of Kazakhstan/Kazmunaygaz (20%), LukArco (5%).   3
pipeline company engaged in monopsonistic practices such as artificially high 
assessments of technical losses, arbitrary long route allocations, and other 
discriminatory pricing including absence of a quality bank which would recognize the 
higher quality of Tengiz oil; the net effect was that transit tariffs for Kazakhstan’s 
crude were typically double those for Russian crude.
4  High transportation costs have 
been a severe obstacle to develop oilfields, especially in central Kazakhstan such as 
Qyzylorda region. Developed by Hurricane Hydrocarbons of Canada, which was 
renamed PetroKazakhstan in 2003, Kumkol’s expansion has been constrained by 
transport costs of around $12/bbl.
5 
The turnaround in 2000 was highlighted by rising oil prices and discovery of 
the huge Kashagan offshore field (see map 1 for details).  Although Kazakhstan only 
reached agreement with Russia in 2002 over delimitation of the Caspian Sea bed, 
oilfields explored in the late 1990s will come online in the first decade of the twenty-
first century with huge potential production levels.   
The pipeline issue is also taking time to resolve, but since 2001 the situation is 
becoming more favourable to Kazakhstan. The opening in autumn 2001 of the first 
privately owned and commercially operated pipeline, the Caspian Pipeline 
Consortium (CPC), provided an alternative route through Russia, which cut transport 
costs from Tengiz in half.
6  Other producers in Kazakhstan have also benefited from 
the CPC.  In early 2003 a 450 km pipeline was completed to link the Uzen (Aktöbe 
region) oilfield, operated by the Chinese National Petroleum Company, to the CPC.  
A 985 km pipeline (second section of the Kazakhstan-China pipeline) linking Atasu, 
in northwestern Kazakhstan, to Alatau pass (Xinjiang) should be completed in 
December 2005.  Also in 2005 the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline was completed, which is of 
less immediate benefit to Kazakhstan but is likely to become an important outlet as 
Azerbaijan’s oil production is projected to plateau rather rapidly  while Kazakhstan’s 
production should continue to expand after 2015.  The late 1990’s game could then 
resume with new players. Indeed, the CPC’s existence led to reductions in the costs of 
using the Transneft pipeline, but with Kazakhstan’s oil production booming, 
additional pipelines will need to be upgraded or built.  
                                                 
4 IMF estimates from International Monetary Fund, “Cross-Border Issues in Energy Trade in the CIS 
Countries”,  IMF Policy Discussion Paper PDP/02/13, December 2002. See also International 
Monetary Fund (2003b). 
5 The firm has been exporting oil by railcar to China and to the Transneft Russian pipeline system. The 
$12 calculation is reported in International Monetary Fund (2003b, 9). Costs would have been reduced 
to $8 if PetroKazakhstan could have joined the Caspian Pipeline Consortium, which opened a new 
pipeline to the Russian Black Sea coast in 2001, but it was induced by the Kazakhstan government to 
sign on to construction of a 700 km link to the existing pipeline network which would reduce its 
transport costs to $9.5 per barrel. In 2003, the company signed an agreement to sell 1 mmt per year to 
Tehran in exchange for Iranian crude on the Gulf.  In 2005 PetroKazakhstan was bought by the Chinese 
National Petroleum Corporation, so its oil’s future destination is likely to be China 
6 The CPC is half-owned by Russia (24%), Kazakhstan (19%) and Oman (7%), and the other half is 
divided among ChevronTexaco (15%), LUKoil (12.5%), ExxonMobil (7.5%), Rosneft/Shell (7.5%), 
Agip (2%), British Gas (2%), Kazakhstan Pipeline Ventures (1.75%) and Oryx Caspian Pipeline 
(1.75%).  After the dissolution of the USSR, the CPC (then consisting of Transneft, Kazakhstan and 
Oman) was awarded the rights to transport oil from Tengiz to the Black Sea, but negotiations dragged 
on how much Chevron should pay towards construction.  After Mobil bought 25% of Tengiz and 
LUKoil/Arco purchased 5%, the Tengiz partners together with other investors took a half-share in the 
CPC.     4
  Institutionally, the state-owned sector was integrated in 2002, when the oil 
exploration and production company, Kazakhoil, merged with the transport company, 
Transport Nefti i Gaza,
7 to form Kazmunaigaz. 
Oil output and exports began to grow rapidly after 1999 (Table 1). Between 
1999 and 2003, Kazakhstan’s oil production grew year-by-year by approximately 
14%, roughly doubling production since independence. By 2010, oil exports could 
almost double in comparison with the 2005 figure. Oil is produced from 55 fields 
(Ernst and Young, 2005, 3)., the largest of which include: Tengiz (oil), Karachaganak 
(oil and gas condensate), Kumkol (oil) and Uzen (oil and gas-bearing).
8  
Oil production is dominated by two regions: Mangghystaou and Atyraou, 
which represented 98% of Kazakhstan’s production in 1970 and now accounts for ¾ 
of national production (see Graph 2 for details). Until the mid 90s, one region, 
Mangghystaou region (located in the Caspian basin) has been traditionally the main 
oil-producing region of the country accounting for more than ¾ of Kazakhstan’s oil 
production. The second old oil-producing region is Atyraou region (again located in 
the Caspian basin). Production started to increase in the 1970s and boomed in the 
1990s after the start of extraction operations in Tengiz. Since then, this oblast, and 
especially its eponym capital, has become the main oil center of the country.  
In the last decade, three new (or relatively new) oil-producing regions have 
emerged: Aqtöbe region and its oil and gas field of Karachaganak, Qyzylorda and 
West Kazakhstan. However, production of these three regions is expected to remain 
limited to ¼ of the production of the country in the next decade. Among them, West 
Kazakhstan remains the most promising.  
Prospects are bright since the bigger offshore Caspian field of Kashagan was 
discovered in 2000. Estimates give 45 billion barrels of which 8-13 billion are 
recoverable with existing technologies. Production should only begin in 2008. By 
2010, the IMF is forecasting annual oil exports of 84 mmt
.  Kazakhstan’s production 
should reach a plateau around 2030 and a first peak in 2018. Unexplored areas of the 
north Caspian are expected to also contain relatively large reserves.   
 
3. Oil Sector in Kazakhstan, the Key Economic Sector 
  
  In the 1990s, the oil sector rapidly became the most important economic sector 
in Kazakhstan. During this period, due to the privatization process, Kazakhstan 
transformed its ownership structure from that of a Communist economy to an oil 
booming economy (Pomfret, 2005). Today, the oil sector represents approximately 
35% of export revenues and 20% of budget revenues (or approximatively 6.5 % of 
GDP).
9 This trend should be strengthened in the coming years. 
                                                 
7 Literally Oil and Gas Transport. It had been the result of a previous merging operation between 
KazTransOil and KazTransGaz. 
8 The Tengiz field with recoverable reserves of 6-9 billion barrels is the largest active field in 
Kazakhstan.  Kumkol field now produces over 7 mmt per year . Uzen production was expected to rise 
to 6 mmt by 2005, from around 2.5 mmt in the late 1990s.  Approximately 1 mmt corresponds to 
20,000 barrels per day. 
9 These figures are equivalent to Russian figures: Russian oil sector represents 20% of GDP, 40% of 
total export revenues and 20% of fiscal revenue of state budget (Cukrowski 2004, 295).   5
Despite the problems, Kazakhstan is the country, which has attracted the 
largest amount of FDI (per capita) among CIS countries.
10 Chevron began negotiating 
for the Tengiz oilfield in 1990, in what was the biggest FDI deal of the USSR’s 
history, but otherwise FDI was sluggish in the first half of the 1990s.  However, from 
1996 to 2000, FDI exceeded one billion dollars a year and since 2001 it has exceeded 
two billion dollars, with over 85 percent going to natural resource activities (the 
amount of FDI in manufacturing remaining small). Investment flows into the oil 
sector reached $4 billion in 2003 (or 13% of GDP). Kashagan developing costs are 
estimated to $29 billion (US DOE, 2004, 4), which will imply large amount of 
incoming FDI to Kazakhstan.   
  Oil production growth has had a strong positive impact on Kazakhstan’s 
economic growth and revenues. In 2003, real GDP grew by almost 10%. Since 2000, 
current fiscal receipts from oil sector, excluded one-time payments, have accounted 
for almost 20% of general government revenue (IMF, 2004, 18).  
 
  
Box 1: Which revenues stem from oil in Kazakhstan? 
 
- export sales of crude oil, Kazakhstan’s share in consortia (after deduction of cost 
recovery expenses under a PSA regime). Export of petroleum products remains a 
minor item; Kazakhstan still imports most of petroleum products consumed in the 
country 
- tax applicable to subsurface users. They depend on the type of tax regime of the 
contract: excess profit tax (EPT) or production-sharing agreement (PSA).
11  In a EPT 
tax regime, the company is liable to pay bonuses, royalty, excess profits tax and a rent 
tax on export of crude oil,
12 whereas in a PSA the company is subject to bonuses, and 
gives up a share of production,
13 rent on export of crude oil (except in fixed price 
PSA) and “top up tax”.  
- taxation of business profit, such as corporate income tax and branch profits tax, 
- indirect taxation  such as VAT, excise and customs duties, 
- other taxes such as environmental fees, property tax, land tax, vehicle tax and other 
fees and licenses. 
 
Source: For more details on the various taxes see Ernst and Young (2005), on which this Box is based  
                                                 
10 Data from European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Transition Report 2003; cumulative 
FDI 1989-2002 of $13,568 million or $938 per capita is the highest in the CIS, although less than FDI 
in Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic 
11 Under a PSA regime, the foreign oil company, as its own risk, is expected to pay all initial 
exploration and development costs. The government receives a direct share of the field’s production, in 
cash or in kind, without any investment by it. The key factors to determine the profit of the foreign oil 
company is the percentage of total production to be used for cost recovery, the share in total production 
to be shared, the procedure to determine the profit and the percentage shares of the profit. According to 
Ernst and Young (2005, 17), PSA and EPT contracts entered into force after 1996 and before January 
1, 2004 are unequivocally grandfathered.   Under a PSA tax regime, foreign companies are exempted 
from excise, property tax, land tax and vehicle tax 
12 This progressive tax was introduced in 2004. The rate depends on market price of a barrel of crude 
oil. For price above $40/barrel, tax rate reaches 33%.   
13 The share attributed to Kazakhstan is determined after deduction of the cost recovery production. The 
share of production allocated to cost recovery may not exceed 75% prior to payback and 50% post 
payback.   6
  
  Oil production generates major revenues for Kazakhstan, especially since tax 
code was amended in 2004. The introduction of the rent tax on export of crude oil has 
raised the government’s share of oil income to a range of 65 to 85% (US DOE 2004, 
3).  In 2003, oil exports brought almost $2 billion to the budget revenue. By 2010, 
revenues stemming from oil exports should reach more than $7 billion. The IMF is 
forecasting undiscounted revenues of $270 billion over the next 45 years, equivalent 
to $99 billion discounted at 5 percent (IMF, 2004, 27).  The latter figure corresponds 
to $6600 per capita. 
 
4. A Typology of Redistribution Oil Revenues in an Oil Economy 
 
This section presents a literature review of the political economy of 
redistribution of oil revenues and a typology of redistribution of oil revenues in oil 
economies. It strives to answer three questions. Why should oil revenues be 
redistributed in an oil economy?
14  What are the redistribution mechanisms in place in 
an oil economy? What is the political economy of redistribution mechanisms?  
Why should oil revenues be redistributed in an oil economy?  As Isham et al. 
(2003, 3) point out, oil is a “point-source” natural resource, which means that it is 
extracted from a narrow geographic and economic base. Consequently, when oil 
production emerges, horizontal inequality strengthens: oil-producing regions may 
disproportionately benefit from additional revenues whereas poor regions could be left 
out of these revenues flows. 
Growing inequality between regions, as a result of an oil boom, justifies that 
oil revenues are substantially redirected to the center and then redistributed. Revenues 
drained to the center may ensure efficient redistribution of oil revenues by producing 
economies of scale in the production of a public good and by stabilizing the economy 
insuring against region-specific shocks (Ahmad and Singh, 2003, 2-3).
15    
However, balance between oil-producing and poorest regions of an oil-
producing country is difficult to reach. Indeed, as equalization and stabilization 
mechanisms (performed by the center) start to function, oil-producing regions express 
discontent because they wish to keep locally a growing share of oil revenues and 
poorer regions of the country express discontent because they wish to benefit more 
from redistribution schemes.  
What are the redistribution mechanisms in place in an oil economy? To answer 
this problem, we propose a typology based on two main questions: who redistributes 
oil revenues, and how is it organized?  We distinguish between three categories:  
1.  Official public redistribution encompasses taxes and revenues stemming from 
oil production shared locally as well as financial transfers from the center. In 
oil-producing regions, revenue-sharing schemes generally replace financial 
transfers from the center unlike what happens in the poorest regions. Local 
governments may redistribute oil revenues through social transfers.  
                                                 
14 A trade-off exists between spending and saving oil revenues. As known, oil revenues in the case of 
an oil boom might have deleterious effects via Dutch disease mechanisms (ie. an appreciating exchange 
rate makes production of other traded goods unprofitable). However, this section only describes 
redistribution mechanisms.  
15 The authors give those justifications for a federal State probably because they built their 
demonstrations on a case of a federal State: Nigeria.    7
2.  Company redistribution encompasses direct, indirect and induced revenues 
that oil companies invest or spend locally.  In the case of the oil sector, 
however, there is no need for large employment or for social programs (or 
“social assets”) and so this type of redistribution is rather geographically 
limited. Oil companies’ headquarters, especially in the case of non-operating 
foreign companies, employ a limited number of staff. 
3.  Unofficial redistribution results from  two factors: 
 (i) not registered household activities. Oil production generates money and 
people inflows.  In order to fulfill the new demands, individuals or households 
may start small businesses.  Self-employment can therefore be the result of oil 
production.  
(ii) informal “leakage” of oil revenues redistributed to the economy. In this 
case, revenues may be used for political or individual purposes.  Measurement 
of this type of unofficial redistribution is obviously the least easy to achieve 
but the “oil curse” literature refers to these types of mechanisms, explaining 
their negative impact on institutions and consequently on growth.  
What is the political economy of redistribution mechanisms when informal leakage 
prevails?  Ross (2001) describes in details the three effects of oil on political 
economy. According to this author, the “rentier effects” may characterize the link 
between oil and a type of rule. In this case, “governments use oil revenues to reduce 
social pressures that would otherwise result in demands for greater accountability” 
(IMF 2004, 12).  Ross (2001) defines three possible sets of mechanisms used to 
reduce those social pressures: 
-  taxation effect: thanks to oil revenues, governments are less likely to tax their 
populations and the population in turn will be less likely to demand 
accountability from their government, 
-  expenditure effect: oil wealth may lead to greater spending on patronage, 
reducing the latent demand for participation in democratic processes, what is 
called “fiscal pacification”, 
-  group-formation effect: government may use oil revenues to prevent the 
formation of social groups that could be inclined to demand more 
accountability. 
Finding comparable results, Kronenberg (2004) demonstrates empirically that oil 
flows has strengthened corruption in transition economies. To confirm this 
relationship between oil and spending, Robinson and Torvik (2005) explain that 
governments may finance “white elephants” because it produces high political 
benefits. 
To summarize, redistribution of oil revenues is desirable in a context of 
revenue equalization and stabilization.  However, efficient redistribution of oil 
revenues remains a difficult task.  In practice, redistribution of oil revenues may be 
used for political purposes in order to reduce social pressures for accountability and 
representation. 
    
5. A Preliminary Estimation of the Impact of Kazakhstan’s Oil Boom  
 
This section presents preliminary results of the impact of the oil boom on 
employment, regional GDP per capita, revenues and expenses of households and 
poverty at the oblast level. It appears that early revenues of the oil boom have 
benefited cities (in oil or non-oil producing regions), whereas people living in rural   8
areas in oil-producing rayons do not seem to benefit from this rent. Consequently, oil 
revenues have strengthened the inequality gap between rich and poor people in the 
country. In general, oil does not generate employment but generates large revenues. 
Kazakhstan confirms those peculiarities of oil production. 
In Kazakhstan (as in most oil exporting countries), oil is produced in few 
regions of the country: five out of fourteen oblasts. At the district level, the share is 
even lower with only 21 oil-producing rayons out of the country’s 158 rayons (cities 
excluded).
16  Concentration of oil production in a limited number of districts should 
enable us to assess the preliminary impact of the oil boom in Kazakhstan. 
A first assessment of the redistribution mechanisms could partially explain 
why cities benefit more from oil revenues than urban areas.  
First of all, it is worth noting that oil revenues are not wholly redistributed in 
Kazakhstan. Indeed, a large share of oil revenues is allocated to the National Fund for 
the Republic of Kazakhstan (see Box 2). 
 
Box 2: The National Fund for the Republic of Kazakhstan  
 
The Fund was established in 2001. The main objective of the Fund is to reduce the 
impact of volatile market prices of natural resources and to smooth the distribution of oil-
wealth over generations.  
Initially, the authorities identified 12 major companies in the natural resources sector. 
However, this figure was reduced to 6 in 2004 and the list limited to petroleum companies. 
Flows consist of a savings component equal to 10 percent of the budgeted baseline revenue 
invariant to price changes and a stabilization component that includes all revenues above the 
baseline price, fixed at $19/bbl. The Fund’s capital is supplied by shares of government 
income from the oil sector, royalties, bonuses and revenues from PSA. Fund is invested in 
foreign equities. Thus, a large share of oil revenues is allocated to the NFRK, which had 
accumulated $5 billion in late 2004 (or approximately 17 % of GDP). 
 
Source: Kalyuzhnova and Kaser (2005) and IMF (2004:19). 
 
In terms of value added, oil production has produced significant results. 
Except for Qyzylorda oblast, regional product per capita is above the national average 
for all oil-producing regions (see Graph 3 for details). The difference is especially 
acute for the old oil-producing regions such as Mangghystaou and Atyraou regions 
(three and four times above the national average). However, the largest increases in 
regional product were recorded in Astana and Almaty cities. 
    Following the typology defined in section 4, a preliminary assessment of oil 
revenues redistribution can be undertaken: 
 
1.  Official public redistribution 
Regional budgets in oil-producing oblasts have largely benefited from oil 
revenues. However, transfer mechanisms have been put in place and are increasingly 
important for lagging regions, especially in the South of the country.  
Between 1997 and 2002, budget revenues of the five oil-producing regions 
increased by 280% whereas budget revenues of the other regions increased by 180% 
                                                 
16 Aqtöbe region: 3 (out of 17), Atyraou region: 7 (all rayons of the oblast), West Kazakhstan: 4 (out of 
12), Qyzylorda region: 3 (out of 7), Mangghystaou region: 4 (all rayons of the oblast). We identified 
oil-producing rayons combining detailed maps of oilfields and oblasts.     9
(Table 2).  Regional authorities in oil-producing regions have increasingly used fines 
and quasi-fiscal policy as a means to increase regional revenues. Previously, central 
authorities levied greenhouse emission rights, but  this has become the mandate of 
regional authorities and, probably as a result, environmental fines increased by 400% 
in 2004 compared to the previous year. Besides, some taxes are collected locally like 
social and income taxes
17.  
Several regions (oil-producing or not) have succeeded in benefiting from 
revenues of the oil boom. Indeed, social expenditures per capita are on average higher 
in oil-producing regions than non-oil producing regions (Graph 4). However, 
Kazakhstan remains a centralized State and, as Dabla-Norris, Martinez-Vasquez and 
Norregaard (2000) point out, local fiscal autonomy in Kazakhstan appears limited. 
Fiscal federalism with revenue-sharing arrangements was tentatively developed 
(McLure 2000), but the implementation seems to vary across regions. Undeniably, 
certain redistribution mechanisms seem to occur but criteria to identify benefiting 
regions are obscure. On average, the share of official transfers in regional revenues is 
indeed higher in most poor regions (Graph 4).
18  Thus, poor regions mainly depend on 
official transfers from the central authorities.  As expected, official transfers do not 
reach oil-producing regions (except Qyzylorda region). Two facts remain disturbing 
about the equal redistribution of oil revenues.  First, central and southern regions of 
the country mainly benefit from those transfers (Jambyl, South Kazakhstan, Almaty, 
Aqmola and Qyzylorda) and not the northern regions, which are equally poor.   
Second, Astana also benefits from those transfers (almost one-fifth of regional 
revenues). 
 
2.  Company redistribution  
Oil companies try to contribute to the development of communities where they 
operate. However, taking into account the immense needs, these projects only address 
a fraction of the needs in infrastructure.  
According to the PSA agreements, consortia are requested to invest in social 
infrastructure projects (SIP). Regional authorities propose local development projects, 
which should reflect the real needs local communities. Despite their possible local 
impact, AgipKCO’s investments only represent 1.25% of the revenues of 
Mangghystaou and Atyraou regions
19 and Karachaganak Petroleum Operating (KPO) 
6,5% of the revenues of West Kazakhstan region.  Until now, AgipKCO has mainly 
financed the building of schools, hospitals, gas pipelines to villages and other 
infrastructure. Annually, this consortium spends $5 million (or 0,15% of regional 
GDP) in Mangghystaou and Atyraou regions.
20  KPO invests annually $10 million in 
West Kazakhstan (or 0,8% of regional GDP). 
 
                                                 
17 Although oil-producing regions transfer a major share of revenues collected: more than 40% of total 
expenditures of Mangghystaou and Atyraou regions. 
18 Calculated on average for the period 2000-2003 from official data.  The difference between the 
poorest and richest regions in terms of budget revenues is declining, whereas in terms of regional 
product per capita the difference is widening.  Regarding regional budget revenues, in 1997, the ratio 
between the richest and the poorest regions was equal to 5,4 and, in 2002, it decreased to 3,6. 
Regarding regional product per capita, this ratio was equal to 5,6 and, in 2002, it increased to 10,3. 
19 Data on regional budgets from Abdiev (2003, 426). 
20 This amount will grow to $18 million per year when Kashagan is fully operational (or 1% of 
expenses to develop Kashagan oilfield).   10
3.   Unofficial public redistribution  
The fulfillment of local additional demand may generate the expansion of self-
employment and small unregistered businesses, and this could be a good explanation 
of unofficial redistribution in Kazakhstan.  
The “leakage” part of the unofficial redistribution is even more difficult to 
assess than the two previous redistribution categories because of an obvious lack of 
data. We propose to give some indications of the symptoms of a possible unofficial 
redistribution. An example of unofficial redistribution concerns the bargaining and 
negotiation processes between oil companies and local and central authorities. The 
definition of the quotas of local employees provides an opportunity for this type of 
process. It is worth noting that quotas were previously agreed in Astana (in the 
Ministry of Labor and Social Protection), but have now become the mandate of 
regional hakims. This bargaining process is said to increase revenues redistribution in 
the circles around hakims in oil-producing regions. 
 
6. Poverty and Living Standards in Kazakhstan Before and During the Oil Boom 
 
Regionally, influx of oil revenues seems to have accelerated the catch-up of 
several lagging regions. But, what is the impact on employment and poverty? Do oil 
revenues strengthen inequality between some well-off cities and poor (oil-producing 
or not) rural regions?  This section gives preliminary results using two sources of 
information: regional descriptive statistics and LSMS data. Deriving from both 
sources, oil-producing regions seem not to have experienced any sustained 
employment growth and poverty and inequality remain worse in oil-producing regions 
than in non-oil regions, especially in rural areas. The most surprising aspect of the 
location results of LSMS is that in 2002, in the midst of an oil boom, location in the 
oil-producing western region is not associated with higher living standards. 
As far as employment is concerned, oil production only expands construction 
activities and only on a temporary basis. One of the best illustrations was the impact 
of the building of the CPC (Caspian Pipeline Consortium) in West Kazakhstan, which 
was positive for employment in the region between 1998 and 2000.  However, after 
the inauguration of the pipeline, building activities shrank, and in 2001 West 
Kazakhstan had a higher unemployment rate than the national average.   
Regarding the unemployment rate, in 2002 all the producing-regions were 
situated above the national average (Graph 5). In Kazakhstan, direct employment in 
the oil sector is estimated to be less than 50,000 people, including employees working 
in the refining sector, which is equivalent to less than 1% of Kazakhstan’s active 
population.
21  The fifty companies included in the Kompass Kazakhstan
22 in the sector 
of oil production only totals 41500 employees. The largest employers in this sector are 
mainly branches in which Kazmunaigaz is a major shareholder such as Ozenmunaigaz 
(12,500 people), Embamunaigaz (12,000) or Mangghystaoumunaigaz (4,400). 
Kazmunaigaz, of which headquarters are located in Astana, acknowledges 400 
employees. As far as joint foreign-Kazakh companies or foreign operators in 
Kazakhstan are concerned, Tengizchevroil declares 2800 employees, Karachaganak 
                                                 
21 Three refineries, located in Kazakhstan: Atyraou, Pavlodar and Shymkent, have a workforce of 
approximately 10000 people.  The active population was 7,4 million in 2002 (Abdiev (2003): 478). 
22 Kompass Kazakhstan is the largest company directory in Kazakhstan. All the major oil companies 
(foreign and national) oil companies are included.   11
500 and Petrokazakhstan 900. For the foreign companies, which do not operate 
oilfields (such as British Gas, Total, or Lukoil), the presence on the ground is limited 
to a dozen or so people to represent the interests of the company. In those conditions, 
needless to say that unemployment rate is not particularly favorable in oil-producing 
regions  
Except in Aktöbe region, the poverty headcount in all oil-producing regions 
remains above the national average (Graph 6): the worst figures being for both the old 
oil-producing regions, Mangghystaou and Atyraou regions.  Despite the importance of 
oil production in Mangghystaou, almost 40% of the population of the region is poor, 
which is the worst result among Kazakhstan’s regions. Mangghystaou region has even 
a higher poverty headcount than Jambyl region, which records the lowest regional 
product per capita. In contrast, poverty in Astana and Almaty cities represents 
respectively 2,2 and 4,1% of cities population (UNDP, 2004, 58).  
In oil-producing regions, the discrepancy between urban and rural areas is 
strong; the poverty headcount is two to three times higher in urban compared to rural 
areas. Producing oil in a rayon is not a guarantee to have less poverty, and in the three 
regions mixing oil producing and non-oil producing rayons (Aktöbe, Qyzylorda and 
West Kazakhstan) only four out of ten rural oil-producing rayons experience less 
poverty than the regional average poverty headcount (Table 3).
23  In the oil-producing 
regions, cities may benefit from oil rents, and in Mangghystaou region the town of 
Aktau has a poverty headcount of 18% whereas the regional average reaches 40%.  
Inequality has substantially grown in oil-producing regions. These regions lie 
above the national average (Table 4). The discrepancy between poor and rich is 
especially acute in Atyraou region, and to a lesser extent in Mangghystaou region.   
We can also use household survey data to compare the determination of per 
capita household expenditure in Kazakhstan during the 1990s transition era with a 
year from the sustained growth period. We examine whether the determinants of 
household expenditure levels changed in importance between the 1996 survey 
conducted under the aegis of the World Bank’s Living Standards Measurement Study 
(LSMS) and a comparable survey in 2002.
24  In the estimating equation, the per capita 
expenditure of households is determined by the level of human capital, the number of 
household members, and the location of the household. Summary statistics for the two 
years are reported in Table 5.
25 
In all of the formerly centrally planned economies the transition to more 
market-based systems was accompanied by changes in the labour markets and in the 
determinants of household expenditure levels.  The role of human capital variables, 
which are consistently significant determinants of earnings in established market 
economies, became more important.  In Central Asia this pattern was accompanied 
during the 1990s by a large increase in the cost (in terms of lower per capita 
                                                 
23 Poverty data at the rayon level are detailed in Ivashenko (2004).  
24 Data availability in the 1990s was hampered by the poor quality of the inherited household budget 
surveys, and external researchers rely almost exclusively on the one-off 1996 LSMS survey; examples 
of use of the dataset are Anderson and Pomfret (2002; 2003), Rama and Scott (1999), and Verme 
(2001).  In 2001 the National Statistical Agency revised the household budget survey using sampling 
techniques and questionnaires comparable to those of the LSMS, although the data are now collected 
continuously and reported quarterly and annually rather than for the two-week period of the 1996 
survey. 
25 The aggregate level of household expenditures is not of interest in the present context because we are 
trying to understand the determinants of relative living standards.     12
household expenditure) of large family size, especially the presence of children.   
Large regional differences in household expenditure, ceteris paribus, also indicated 
that national labour markets were not yet established in Central Asia.  In Anderson 
and Pomfret (2002; 2003) these three sets of variables were consistently significant in 
various specifications, while other demographic characteristics such as the ethnicity, 
age, health or marital status of the head of the household were seldom statistically 
significant and had little explanatory power.   
The dependent variable is household expenditures per capita,
  based on a 
headcount of household members
26 and the reported expenditures on goods 
(excluding vehicles), food, health, education and other services, housing, utilities, 
communication, and transportation.
27   
To capture human capital, we report regression results using completed 
secondary education as the control variables. Measures of the education level attained 
by the highest-educated household member are assumed to be indicative of the 
household’s human capital.
28  In the education categories the major change has been 
the fall in the portion reporting vocational-technical education.
29  The proportion of 
households without anybody who completed secondary education is higher in 2002 
than in 1996, although there appear to be some anomalous entries in this category.  In 
analysing the 1996 data, Anderson and Pomfret used the incomplete secondary 
schooling as the omitted education category, but with the 2002 data this led to 
generally insignificant coefficients.  The reason for this anomaly appears to be the 
presence of a few households reporting no education but having high expenditure 
                                                 
26 Anderson and Pomfret (2002) test the sensitivity of the results to this assumption (ie. assigning equal 
expenditure weight to all children and adults in the household) by estimating the model with an 
alternative dependent variable in which children, women and the elderly are assigned lower expenditure 
weights than prime working age adult men. The results do not change in any significant way. The 
numerical results might also be sensitive to the implicit assumption of no scale economies in the 
provision of household services; adjusting for economies of size with a scaling such as E* = E/n
θ, where 
E is household expenditure and n is family size, would soften the main conclusion about household 
size.  Given that small households typically consist of adults, the equivalence scale implicitly makes 
some allowance for scale economies, but beyond that it is uncertain which equivalence scale would be 
appropriate.  Some studies of transition economies find that the qualitative results are not sensitive to 
assumptions about size economies, eg. Jovanovic (2001) reports that varying θ within a plausible range 
did not alter his results for Russia in any significant way.  
27 Expenditure is preferred to income because the arrears problem in former Soviet republics during the 
1990s meant that income often came in lumps so that many households reported zero income during the 
two-week survey period.  We also expect under-reporting to avoid tax or other impositions to be less 
prevalent for expenditure.  Non-purchased items, such as food grown on household plots, are valued 
and included in expenditure. Because the log of expenditure more closely follows a normal distribution, 
we estimate semi-logarithmic regressions of the log of per capita expenditure on household 
characteristics. 
28Education is characterized by five levels: higher education (university and postgraduate), Tecnikum 
education, vocational or other technical training, completed secondary education, and incomplete 
secondary schooling.  In analysing the 1996 situation Anderson and Pomfret found no significant 
difference between using education variables based on the head of household’s education and using the 
highest-educated person.  For 2002, we use highest-educated person because, rather than following a 
consistent definition, the surveyors appear to have treated the person who answered the questionnaire as 
the head of household. 
29 This is consistent with other evidence from Central Asia and elsewhere that during the 1990s much of 
the specialized lower-level technical training from the Soviet era had no market value in the transition 
economy.  People ceased taking such courses, and in some cases may no longer have claimed this type 
of training as an education.  The drop in the vocational-technical category is largely matched by an 
increase in the number reporting completed secretary as their highest level of education.     13
levels; 28 of the households reporting nobody with completed secondary education 
had income levels around 600,000 tenge, ie. over six standard deviations above the 
sample mean.
30  For this reason we omit the 9.4 percent of households in the lowest 
education group; the results for the other variables are almost identical to the results 
when the entire sample is used. 
Location of the household is measured by five region-specific dummy 
variables.
31  The Central region contains Aqmola and Qaraghandy oblasts and Astana 
City.  The South is Jambyl, Qyzylorda and South Kazakhstan oblasts.  The West 
consists of Aqtöbe, Atyraou, West Kazakhstan and Mangghystaou oblasts, where 
most of the country’s oil-production is located.  The North is Qostanai , Pavlodar and 
North Kazakhstan oblasts.  The East is East Kazakhstan and Almaty oblasts, but not 
Almaty city.  The omitted category for regional location is the largest city, Almaty. 
Household composition is measured by three variables describing the number 
of children under the age of 18, the number of elderly, and the number of non-elderly 
adults in the household.
 32  
  The regressions demonstrate that the three groups of variables, which 
dominated in 1996, remain statistically significant, but the magnitude of the 
coefficients changes considerably in 2002 (Table 6).    
Family size continues to be negatively related to household living standards, 
but the magnitudes are much smaller in 2002 and there is little distinction between the 
age groups.  Whereas in 1996 having an extra child was the largest cost in terms of 
lower per capita household expenditure and an elderly person brought the next highest 
cost, the impact of these two age groups in 2002 differs little from that of an 
additional working-age adult. 
Education remains important.  In 2002 having a university or Tecnikum 
educated person in the household is associated with 6-7% higher per capita household 
expenditures,  ceteris paribus, than having nobody educated beyond completed 
secondary education.  The changes in the magnitudes of the effect of different levels 
of human capital between 1996 and 2002 are difficult to assess because there is a 
difference in definition (household head in 1996 versus highest-educated person in 
2002) and in control group between the first and last columns of Table 6.
33  
Nevertheless, it does appear that the returns to greater skill and education levels were 
lower in 2002, which is surprising. 
  The location variable shows the most striking differences between 1996 and 
2002.  In 1996 a household located in the North had on average a 30% higher living 
                                                 
30 The average per capita expenditure level for households in the lowest education category is over 
114,000 tenge, which is above the sample average and higher than for any other education category 
apart from those with university degrees. 
31 The main change in location is an increase in the proportion of households from the oil-producing 
western region and a decline in the proportion in the Centre and North.  The number of people per 
household increased slightly from 3.59 to 3.69.  The change was due to an increase in working age 
adults per household and a smaller increase in the elderly, partially offset by a smaller number of 
children.  This reflects the demographic patterns of the 1990s when the birthrate fell and the death rate 
rose. It also might be influenced by emigration patterns, as a disproportionate number of elderly were 
among the Germans and Slavs who left Kazakhstan during the 1990s. 
32 For 2002 “elderly” is defined as aged 60 or over.  For 1996 Anderson and Pomfret (2002) defined a 
person as elderly if he or she was eligible for a state pension, ie. at age 60 for a man and age 55 for a 
woman.   
33 In regressions using the entire sample and having incomplete secondary education as the control, the 
coefficients on all education levels apart from university did not differ from zero at the five percent 
significance level.   14
standard than a similar household in Almaty and a household located in the South had 
a 45% lower living standard than one in Almaty ceteris paribus, while the other 
regions were not significantly different from Almaty.  In 2002 households in all 
locations outside Almaty had significantly lower living standards than otherwise 
similar households in Almaty.  The difference is still most pronounced, negatively, in 
the South, but the situation of households in the North and East is significantly worse 
than Almaty in 2002 whereas they were better off than Almaty households in 1996.  
The improved position of the Central region (relative to all other regions except 
Almaty) may have been due to moving the capital to Astana, located in the Centre, 
and the substantial public construction associated with that decision.  The most 
striking aspect of the location results is that in 2002, in the midst of an oil boom, 
location in the oil-producing western region is not associated with higher living 
standards. It is even more problematic for those populations because they may face 
possible relocation, environmental and health problems linked to oil extraction.
34  
  
7. Informal Redistribution, the Current Prevalent Redistribution Mechanism in 
Kazakhstan  
This section presents the results of analysis of the 2002 household survey data 
to distinguish between channels for redistribution of the oil boom benefits.  Initial 
results suggest that little happens through higher wages in oil-producing districts or 
through social transfers, but that “informal” earnings (captured by households having 
much higher expenditures than incomes) are more important in the oil districts than in 
the country as a whole.  Informal earnings are, however, even more prevalent for 
households in Astana, the new national capital, and to a lesser extent in Almaty, the 
financial capital. 
One faces a major problem to measure the informal incomes of households, 
though that could demonstrate the importance of “unofficial redistribution”. Usually, 
unofficial incomes are underestimated in surveys. However, when one compares 
incomes and expenditures, a large share of expenditures is not covered by 
corresponding incomes.  We construct a specific variable as a proxy for the 
undeclared incomes; if the household’s total expenditures are more than twice as large 
as the total incomes, then we assume that the household participates in some kind of 
informal activities.  
Building on the typology of redistribution mechanisms presented in section 4, 
variables were created proxying for the three types of redistribution: official public, 
company redistribution and informal redistribution (see Appendix). With this end in 
view, we construct the following mutually exclusive categorical variables:
35  
1.  Official public redistribution is the dominant mechanism if the income from 
wages is lower than the income from social transfers.  In addition, we verify 
that total household expenditures are lower than twice the total incomes of the 
household.  In a household that fulfils both conditions, we conclude that the 
household essentially benefits from official public redistribution (social 
transfers). This category represents 12.5 of the sample if we compare this 
                                                 
34 In Kazakhstan, a buffer zone exists, requesting relocation when new drilling sites are closer than 6.2 
miles. In 2004, people from Saykamys (3500 inhabitants), located close to new drilling sites for Tengiz, 
were relocated.   
35 Redistribution may combine several types of redistribution. However, in this paper, we try to identify 
the main source of incomes, which means that the three types of redistribution are exclusive. 
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result with the poverty rate in Kazakhstan there is 24.2 % (graph 7) there is 
probably a lack of social transfers in 2002. If we take into account only the 
household head, less than 5 % of them benefit from social transfers. 
2.  Company redistribution is the dominant mechanism if the income from wages 
is  higher than the income from social transfers and if total household 
expenditures are less than twice total income.  In a household that fulfils both 
conditions, we conclude that the household essentially benefits from wage 
redistribution,  i.e. a wage-earning household.  Becasuse wages in the oil 
industry are high, if oil companies employ a large number of employees, this 
type of redistribution can be expected to be high. About 44 percent of the 
sample is in this category, which is indicative of how little importance the 
formal sector has in Kazakhstan, and how difficult it is to tax wages.  
3. Informal redistribution is the dominant mechanism if total household 
expenditures are higher than twice the total incomes.  In this case we conclude 
that the household essentially benefits from informal redistribution, i.e. 
undeclared activities.
36  The informal redistribution group represents 43.5 % of 
our sample. This figure is similar to other measures of the informal economy, 
about 34.2 to 38.2 % of GDP, gathered by Enste and Shneider (2000). 
If we cross our dummy on redistribution with some of the main individual 
characteristics of the household head (under 60 years old) we find some preliminary 
results (Appendix 1).  First women (58.5%) benefit more from social transfers. This is 
quite normal because women during the transition are usually a more vulnerable part 
of the society especially when they are single with children. For both formal and 
informal redistribution, males are more frequently (about 55%) accessing to job and 
incomes.  A second observation is that with respect to age characteristics the only 
significant difference comes from social transfers; older household heads
37 receive 
more social transfers than others.  For education differences, less educated heads of 
household seem to benefit more from the social redistribution.  This is also true for 
informal redistribution. Finally we ask whether oil producing rayons influence the 
kind of redistribution occurring in Kazakhstan. We observe that informal 
redistribution is more often happening in oil producing rayons. 
  We will now try to verify this preliminary result, by using multinomial logistic 
regression in order to analyze the three different possible redistributions. Our three 
constructed modalities of oil redistribution (1- social redistribution, 2-enterprise, 3-
informal) are exclusive. We assume that our three redistributions are not correlated. 
At this stage of the paper we use a simple multinomial regression without any 
conditionality; we assume that individuals are free to choose the redistribution they 
want, which is of course a simplification. 
  The main results are reported in Table 7.  Compared to the control category 
(enterprise redistribution) social redistribution is positively associated with residence 
in a small town or in a rural area and is negatively related to the household head’s 
education level or residence in Almaty or Astana.  The effect of residence in an oil-
producing rayon is not statistically significant.  Informal redistribution is also 
positively related to residence in a small town or in a rural area and negatively related 
to the household head’s education level, but it is positively related to residence in the 
capital city and to residence in an oil-producing rayon. 
                                                 
36 An informal activity is considered as a small, family activity by the ILO. 
37 Here we analysed the head of the household younger than 60.   16
  The individual data allow us to more precisely characterize the redistribution 
mechanisms.  Our main result is that in oil districts (rayons) we do not find any 
particular social redistribution but rather a strong informal redistribution. However the 
informal redistribution may include also domestic agriculture and could explain the 
rural area effect.  Both social and informal redistribution are more prevalent for less 
educated household heads and small town inhabitants relative to company 
redistribution. There is some evidences that low skilled people and rural area 
inhabitant are not benefiting from the oil sector development. This is consistent with 
reports from the Tengiz region of complaints by the local population that they are not 
employed in oil production. On the other hand capital and large cities seem to benefit 
from the oil production but mainly through informal redistribution.    
 
8. Conclusions  
 
Whether resource abundance is a curse or a blessing depends upon the nature 
of the resource and on variables reflecting institutions and governance.  Of all 
resources, oil appears to produce the most extreme outcomes, from Nigeria to 
Norway.  Kazakhstan is interesting because the scale of the future oil boom was 
scarcely anticipated during the 1990s and because key institutions remain in 
embryonic and malleable form. 
  The evidence marshalled in this case study is preliminary, as the story is still 
unfolding. Political and institutional developments during the decade after 
independence created a situation where political economy mechanisms could turn oil 
wealth into a curse.   
The household survey analysis presented in this paper gives a preliminary 
assessment of the impact of oil revenues expansion. Early results could explain that 
most benefits may have not been redistributed evenly across the country The 
household survey analysis gives evidence that oil boom has not resulted in higher 
living standards in the oil-producing regions, but have been associated with higher 
living standards in the capital city and in the metropolitan centres where the country’s 
elite lives. As a Kazakh living in Sarykamys, a settlement near Tengiz oilfield, was 
saying: “we have a lot of oil, but we’re not the masters of this oil”, expressing a 
feeling many people in Kazakhstan share. 
Unofficial redistribution could seem to be the main transmission channel of 
redistribution of oil revenues. A complementary analysis would be needed, especially 
in oil-producing regions, to distinguish if it results from unregistered household small 
activities or “leakage” of oil revenues. Transparency concerning oil revenues is 
probably a guarantee to limit those leakages. 
   Use of oil revenues remains an evolving process.  In Kazakhstan, the early 
stage of the oil boom means that the jury still has a long wait before determining 
whether oil will be a blessing or a curse.    17
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Map 1: North Caspian Main Oilfields 
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Table 1: Oil and Gas Output and Exports, 1998-2002 
 
  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Oil production (mmt)  25,6 29,4 35,4 39,3 47,3
Oil exports (mmt)  20,4 23,7 29,4 31,7 39,5
Oil exports ($m.)  1650 2164 4429 4463 5157
Oil exports (in % of GDP)  7,5 12,8 24,1 20,2 20,9
World oil price ($/bbl)  13,1 18,0 28,2 24,3 24,9
Natural gas production (bcm)  7,9 9,9 11,5 11,6 13,1
 
Source: International Monetary Fund (2003b, p.8 (oil) and p.72 (gas)). 
 
 
Graph 2: Share of Oil Production by Regions, 1970-2010 
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Source : Kazakhstan Republic Statistical Agency (2001) and Kazakhstan Ministry of Energy. 
 
Note: Caspian includes Mangghystaou, Atyraou and West Kazakhstan regions 
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Source: Smailov (2001) and Abdiev (2003).  
 
 
Table 2: Regional Budgets 1997-2002 
 








Aktöbe  0,98  14,6  1,02  24,5  1,02  17,1 
Atyraou  0,98  9,0  1,12  36,1  0,92  22,7 
Qyzylorda  1,00  47,9  0,98  40,4  1,03  27,3 
Mangghystaou  0,99  9,6  1,05  32,3  0,94  20,1 
West Kazakhstan  0,96  26,3  1,05  18,7  1,00  24,0 
Astana city  1,00  74,4  1,00  40,3  0,96  32,9 
Almaty city  1,05  8,6  0,99  22,7  1,01  18,6 
Aqmola  1,02  48,7  1,02  29,8  1,01  31,3 
Almaty region  1,00  23,3  1,02  25,2  1,00  30,9 
East Kazakhstan  1,01  21,9  1,01  31,2  0,96  22,1 
Jambyl  0,99  30,7  1,00  33,5  0,97  42,1 
Qaraghandy  0,90  15,2  1,13  20,6  0,96  16,9 
Qostanaï  0,96  16,5  1,02  16,7  1,00  22,0 
Pavlodar  0,92  18,7  1,03  17,0  0,96  20,8 
North Kazakhstan  1,00  25,4  1,04  28,1  0,98  29,2 
South Kazakhstan  1,00  25,1  0,99  27,6  1,00  30,8 
Oil Regions Average  0,99  17,4  1,07  30,7  0,97  22,0 
Kazakhstan Average  0,99  19,8  1,04  26,6  0,98  23,6 
 
Source: Smailov (2001) and Abdiev (2003). 
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Source: Data from Sarsenov (2005). 
 
 





































































































































































































































































Kazakhstan Average  24,2  15,6  34,7 
Aktöbe  22,6 6,9  21,3 
Atyraou  34,1 27,5  44,4 
Qyzylorda  32,3 22,1  48 
Mangghystaou  39,8 28,8  84,6 
West Kazakhstan  28 11,4  39 
Astana city  2,2 2,2  - 
Almaty city  4,1 4,1  - 
Jambyl  35,8 31,3  39,1 
South Kazakhstan  27,5 22,3  30,4 
Source: Abdiev (2003). 
 
 





Kazakhstan Average  0,328 
Aktöbe  0,344 
Atyraou  0,429 
Qyzylorda  0,323 
Mangghystaou  0,36 
West Kazakhstan  0,345 
Astana city  0,314 
Almaty city  0,293 
Jambyl  0,293 
South Kazakhstan  0,275 
 
Source: Abdiev (2003): 147. 
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Table 5: Household Surveys: Summary Statistics 
 
   Kazakhstan Kazakhstan 
Variables  (1996) (2002) 
 
Per capita expenditure:  4963.76 112,524.3
 (3515.27) (75,999.73)
Education of Most Highly Educated: 
University  (%)  26.8 24.9
Tecnikum (%)  33.1 32.9
Vocational-technical (%)  26.6 12.9
Completed secondary (%)   7.8 19.9
Incomplete secondary (%)   5.7   9.4
 
Location of household: 
Central (%)  20.7 19.5
South (%)  18.1 18.8
West (%)  8.5 12.5
North (%)  22.3 19.5
East (%)  21.0 21.0




Number of children  1.263 1.167
 (1.228) (1.244)
Number of elderly  0.414 0.460
 (0.676) (0.685)
Number of non-elderly adults  1.914 2.060
 (1.119) (1.386)
Sample size (households)  1,890 12,000
 
Notes: Standard deviations of continuous variables are in parentheses. Expenditures are in national 
currency units (tenge); note that the two surveys’ observation periods differ so that the nominal  
tenge values are not comparable even apart from problems of measuring inflation.   27
Table 6: Household Expenditure Model: Kazakhstan, 1996 and 2002. 
 
   1996  2002 
Variables   Coefficient  t-statistic  Coefficient  t-statistic 
Intercept 8.542*  89.60  12.19*  488.62 
        
Education:          
University 0.272*  5.62  0.069*  4.53 
Tecnikum 0.167*  3.63  0.057*  3.97 
Vocational-technical training  0.114*  2.56  0.020*  1.13 
Completed secondary  -.001  -0.02  --  -- 
        
Location of household:          
Central -0.036  -0.70  -0.527*  -23.43 
South -0.447*  -8.38  -0.971*  -42.16 
West 0.089  1.43  -0.626*  -25.92 
North 0.295*  5.67  -0.720*  -31.72 
East (not Almaty city)  0.038  0.74  -0.742*  -33.02 
      
Household composition:          
Number of children  -0.174*  -14.04  -0.023*  -5.02 
Number of elderly -0.116*  -3.82  -0.017*  -1.97 
Number of non-elderly adults  -0.058*  -4.18  -0.012*  -2.87 
              
R-square 0.30    0.17   
F-statistic 47.14*    223.44   
Sample size   1,890     10,716   
 
 
An asterisk indicates significant at the 5% level. 
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Table 7: Multinomial Logistic Regression Results 
(dependent variable is the redistribution variable defined in the Appendix Table 1) 
 
 
Variables Coefficient  Standard 
error 
Probability 
of coef. =0 
      
1. Official public redistribution 
sex -0,08  0,04  0,06 
age 0,05  0,00  0,00 
married -0,32  0,04  0,00 
Education -0,26  0,01  0,00 
Almaty -1,49  0,12  0,00 
Astana -1,77  0,39  0,00 
Medium city  0,24  0,08  0,00 
Small town  0,34  0,07  0,00 
Rural 0,99  0,05  0,00 
Oil production  0,07  0,10  0,45 
Size of the household  -0,19  0,01  0,00 
Constant -1,88  0,12  0,00 
      
3. Informal redistribution 
sex 0,12  0,03  0,00 
age 0,01  0,00  0,00 
married -0,33  0,03  0,00 
Education -0,13  0,01  0,00 
Almaty 0,11  0,05  0,03 
Astana 1,30  0,09  0,00 
Medium city  -0,05  0,06  0,42 
Small town  0,44  0,04  0,00 
Rural 1,30  0,03  0,00 
Oil production  0,23  0,06  0,00 
Size of the household  -0,13  0,01  0,00 
Constant -0,08  0,07  0,29 
      
Number of observations  32,229     
LR chi2(22)  6,618.2     
Prob > chi2  0.0000     
Pseudo R2  0.104     
      
 
Outcome redistribution==2 (enterprise redistribution) is the control group   29
Appendix:  Descriptive Statistics by Type of Redistribution 
 
 
1. Type of Redistribution 
 
  Redistribution type  Number of 
households 
Percentage 
Official Public  4039         12.5 
Company 14166  44.0 
Informal 14024  43.5 
Total 32229   
  
Source: own calculations with LSMS Kazakh data  
 
 
2. Cross Table Gender  
 
sex Official  Public  Company  Informal  Total 
     
male 134  2,268 1,956 4,358   
(in %)  41.49  55.74  54.11  54.43  
     
female 189  1,801  1,659  3,649   
(in %)  58.51  44.26  45.89  45.57  
     
Total 323  4,069 3,615 8,007   
 100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00 
 
Sources: own calculations using LSMS Kazakh data for household head under 60 year old. 
 
 
3. Cross Table Age  
    
  Average age  Standard deviation  Number of obs. 
Official Public  48.5 9.0  323 
Company  44.9 8.4  4069 
Informal  45.3 8.4  3615 
    
Total 45.2  8.5  8007 
 
Sources: own calculations using LSMS Kazakh data for household head under 60 year old. 
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4. Cross Table Education  
     
Redistribution  Primary and no 
education 
Secondary University   Total 
Official Public  48 239  36 323   
(in %)  14.86  73.99  11.15  100.00  
        
Company  187 2,922  960 4,069   
(in %)  4.60  71.81  23.59  100.00  
        
Informal 297  2,791  527  3,615   
(in %)  8.22  77.21  14.58  100.00  
        
Total 532  5,952  1,523  8,007   
 6.64  74.33  19.02  100.00 
 
Sources: own calculations using LSMS Kazakh data for household head under 60 year old. 
 
 
5.  Cross Table Oil/Non-Oil rayons  
   
Redistribution Non-oil  rayons  Oil-producing 
rayons 
 
Official Public  303 20  323   
(in %)  3.96  5.63  4.03  
      
Company  3,924 145  4,069   
(in %)  51.28  40.85  50.82  
      
Informal 3,425  190  3,615   
(in %)  44.76  53.52  45.15  
      
Total 7,652  355  8,007   
 100.00  100.00  100.00 
 
Sources: own calculations using LSMS Kazakh data for household head under 60 year old. 
 